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The pressures of a world-wide financial crisis, mass migration, and a globalizing 
economy have created a new transnational cleavage between the “winners” and “losers” of 
globalization. While European and North American democracies are not the only states to feel 
the pressures of globalization, the emergence of a transnational cleavage has been under-
examined outside of these areas. One clear candidate when examining transnational forces on 
political parties is Turkey. In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has moved from 
pro-European “Muslim Democrats” to defensive nationalism, while the opposition, the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), has attempted a pivot toward “new left” politics. Can the 
pressures of an emerging transnational cleavage explain party movement in Turkey? This thesis 
finds partial support for the theory that globalization drives positional realignment amongst 
Turkish parties, but further research is needed on how party positions toward immigration are 











“Caught as the city is between traditional culture and Western culture, inhabited as it is by an ultra-
rich minority and an impoverished majority, overrun as it is by wave after wave of immigrants, 
divided as it has always been along the lines of many ethnic groups, Istanbul is a place where, for 
the past hundred and fifty years, no one has been able to feel completely at home.” 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Across Europe, vote shares for traditional parties have plummeted as the salience of the 
party platforms on which they were established has declined (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). Political 
competition in Europe and North America has increasingly been centered around immigration, 
supranational governance, and globalizing trade as opposed to traditional economic issues. 
Scholars have defined the cause of this to be a new globalization/transnational cleavage: a societal 
divide that separates voters into the “winners” and “losers” of globalization, and structures party 
competition around those blocs (Kriesi et. al, 2008; Teney et. al, 2014; Hooghe and Marks, 2018; 
Strijbis et. al, 2018).1  But globalization, supranational governance, and increased immigration are 
not trends that are exclusive to Europe and North America. Can transnational forces explain party 
movement outside of these regions? This thesis will examine a case that is both ripe for analysis 
of the transnational cleavage, and one with massive implications for the future of the European 
Union (EU): Turkey. Using a mixture of expert survey data and manifesto coding, this thesis will 
answer the question: Are the transnational forces driving change in EU member state parties 
driving change in Turkish parties as well? 
                                                
1 Kriesi et. al (2008) provide a framework for profiling the voters who fit into these two camps. It is worth quoting 
at length from their definition: “...the likely winners of globalization include entrepreneurs and qualified employees 
in sectors open to international competition, as well as cosmopolitan citizens. Losers of globalization, by contrast, 
include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees, and 
citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community,” (p. 8).  
 
 2 
In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) has 
occupied government for the last eighteen years, with the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi, CHP) in opposition. Throughout their first term in government, the AKP was a pro-
Europe party, intent on making the democratic reforms necessary to join the EU. It was the CHP, 
traditionally associated with Kemalism, that engaged in “soft-Euroscepticism” (Öniş, 2007).2 Now 
the AKP, and its leader President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have clearly and publicly moved away 
from Europe and the EU and pushed for greater security of Turkey’s national borders. The shift of 
a party in power from “Muslim Democrats” to autocratic nationalists is puzzling in many ways, as 
well as the formerly authoritarian CHP aligning themselves with Kurdish nationalists and 
reinvigorating their claim to be a social democratic party and champions of Turkey’s EU 
membership bid (Alaranta, 2019). There is some evidence that the parties have begun to polarize 
along issues of democratization, social rights, and the European Union, with the AKP turning 
inwards and toward nationalism as the CHP looks to a broader leftist coalition (Bayram, 2015; 
Esen and Gümüşçü, 2017; Arslantaş et. al, 2020). Since 2011, the Europeanization3 process in 
Turkey under the AKP has slowed to the point that scholars now dub this the era of de-
Europeanization (Yilmaz, 2016). Change in policy toward the EU from both the AKP and the CHP 
implies that the transnational cleavage, which has polarized parties within the EU over the issue 
of further European integration (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016) and dominated European politics over 
the last decade, might be at play in Turkey as well. 
                                                
2 Öniş (2007) defines Soft-Euroscepticism as a party position in which a party is nominally in favor of EU 
membership, but is skeptical of making the reforms required under the Copenhagen Criteria for membership. This 
applies to the CHP in that their mandate and “brand” defined them as a pro-westernization party, but they were wary 
to make further democratic reforms that would increase the power of the already dominant AKP. 
 
3 Europeanization is defined here as economic, legal, and political reforms designed to bring Turkey closer to the 
standards that the EU holds for membership (i.e. the Copenhagen Criteria). This definition does not address the 
broader cultural attempts at Europeanization that were supported by Kemalists. 
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The explosion of unrest in Turkish politics after the anti-government and anti-Erdoğan 
Gezi park protests in 2013 demonstrated that there is a young urban middle class that is willing to 
push for green and leftist policies (Zürcher, 2017; Draege, 2019). The deeply contested 
constitutional referendum on expanding the powers of the Turkish presidency to provide President 
Erdoğan with even greater influence over the government in 2017 revealed further stark partisan 
divides over visions of democracy. The AKP campaign politicized the EU after a series of 
diplomatic crises involving Turks living in Europe allowed Erdoğan to frame voting “yes” in the 
referendum as a defiant response to the “crusader alliance” of the Europeans (Esen and Gümüşçü, 
2017, p. 308). While the AKP-backed-amendments eventually passed, they did so with a much 
smaller section of the electorate than the supporter parties had garnered just two years earlier in 
the 2015 general elections (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2017). The hotly contested local elections of 2019 
similarly saw a rise in polarization, and a victory for the CHP in a post which had previously 
belonged to President Erdoğan: Mayor of Istanbul (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2019). These events 
suggest that the forces of a transnational cleavage in response to rising migration, supranational 
governance, and a globalizing economy are shaping political competition in Turkey as they have 
shaped competition in the EU. 
To test the theory that Turkish parties have responded to the emergence of a transnational 
cleavage in a similar manner as have political parties in EU member states, I will first highlight 
the previous research on cleavage theory and focus specifically on the emergence of a new 
globalization/transnational cleavage and well the gaps in this research. Second, I will proceed to 
give an overview of the history and unique characteristics of Turkish party competition and social 
cleavages, coming up to the current political context and electoral system. Next I will proceed with 
an explanation of my hypotheses and expected results, which will involve a descriptive data 
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analysis of expert survey data from the Global Party Survey (GPS) in tandem with manifesto 
content data on Turkish parties obtained from the Manifesto Project (MP) database. The time of 
analysis will be contained from 2002 to 2019, beginning with the election when the AKP first took 
power and closing with the most recent data available. Finally, the results will be discussed and 
























CHAPTER 2: CLEAVAGE THEORY AND GLOBALIZATION: 
THE EMERGENCE OF A TRANSNATIONAL DIVIDE 
 
Hooghe and Marks (2018) theorize that a new societal cleavage caused by the critical 
juncture of globalization is dividing voters between the “winners” and “losers” of a globalizing 
world. This cleavage, they argue, divides voters into blocs between pro-globalization and anti-
globalization camps, and leads to either the creation of new challenging parties in low barrier 
systems, or positional shift in existing parties in high barrier systems.4 They argue that this 
cleavage is manifested in the “new politics” issues of supranational cooperation/EU integration 
and immigration, because these are the most visible manifestations of globalization to the average 
voter. They build on Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) original cleavage theory, which dictates that 
parties are based upon deep rooted social divisions which are voter driven and were frozen based 
on the structure of European society at the time of mass suffrage. In this definition, social cleavages 
are deep running conflicts in a society which divide voters into blocs as advocates or opponents of 
a set of issues related to that division, thus structuring political parties. While Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) identified four major cleavages at play in Europe at the time, each society and political 
system has unique social cleavages that structure competition. Criticism of Lipset and Rokkan’s 
                                                
4 Low barrier system and high barrier system refer to the thresholds and obstacles that a political system places in 
the way of a new party being able to gain representation in a legislature. In a low barrier system, it is relatively easy 
for a new party to organize, campaign, and garner seats in the legislature. In a high barrier system, a new party faces 




thesis has mainly been centered on their “freezing hypothesis”.5 This tenant of their argument 
dictated that the fundamental social structures of the era of universal manhood suffrage were 
essentially frozen in place, which explained the lack of change in western European parties 
between the twenties and their time of writing. Since then, however, there have been major 
upheavals in European party structures which seem to invalidate this hypothesis, leading to a great 
deal of academic critique. In their development of the transnational cleavage argument, Hooghe 
and Marks move forward from the freezing hypothesis and suggest a new framework for 
understanding when and how new cleavages arise in response to exogenous shocks. 
 Hooghe and Marks (2018) choose to abandon the freezing hypothesis as a part of their 
understanding of cleavage structure, and argue that the basis of cleavage theory is that external 
social frameworks shape party competition in any given political space; essentially, voters drive 
parties, not the other way around. They then posit that when a new cleavage develops in a system 
where political parties are already established, that “the response of a party system to a serious 
exogenous shock takes the form of challenging, rather than reformed, political parties,” (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2018, p. 112). The new cleavage does not replace already existing ones, but rather 
layers on top of them, to create the new political milieu of that society. The emergence of 
challenging parties, however, is only expected in systems with low barriers to entry for new parties. 
In systems where the barriers to entry for new parties are high, existing parties will wield a greater 
ability to maintain power even as they are internally divided over the new cleavage. Using the 
GAL/TAN6 dimension of political leaning (Hooghe et. al, 2002), they hypothesize that in a high 
                                                
5 For critiques of Lipset and Rokkan’s “freezing hypothesis” see Crewe (1985), Inglehart (1984), or Mair (1997). 
These sources argue that the freezing hypothesis was true in the 1960s but no longer held true (Crewe and 
Inglehart), or that the freezing hypothesis was never true and the cleavages at play in a society are always in flux 
(Mair). 
 
6 As a way of explaining party structure in response to “new politics” Hooghe et. al (2002) lay out the GAL/TAN 
dimension which covers a party’s stance on post-materialist political issues such as supranational cooperation, 
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barrier system, already existing GAL parties will become the pro-transnational party, and already 
existing TAN parties will become the anti-transnational party. In a system such as Turkey’s, with 
high barriers to entry and a high degree of polarization, Hooghe and Marks understanding of 
cleavage theory predicts that emergent transnational forces will drive policy change within the 
already existing major parties —the AKP and the CHP— to better reflect their new-found positions 
as the anti-and-pro transnational factions. 
 Hooghe and Marks applied this thesis to the rise of new parties in Europe after the financial 
and migration crises in 2008 and 2015, which they identify as the catalyzing exogenous shocks for 
the electoral shifts witnessed across the continent in recent years. They are not, however, the only 
scholars to apply cleavage theory to the new alignment of parties worldwide. Similar ideas about 
a globalization driven cleavage have been called a “demarcation-integration” cleavage (Kriesi et. 
al, 2008), as well as a “cosmopolitan-communitarian” cleavage (Teney et. al, 2014). These 
concepts all refer to a new cleavage driven by the critical juncture of globalization, which divides 
voters and parties between the “winners” and “losers” of globalization, and centers around issues 
of immigration and supranational coordination.7 The new alignment of parties in the post-crisis 
era is still being contested as fresh movements continue to form in democracies around the globe, 
and yet the study of a globalization cleavage has been largely restricted to EU member states and 
similarly wealthy democracies. Globalization is, by nature, a world-wide phenomenon. This makes 
it necessary to examine the propensity of this phenomenon to drive political conflict outside of 
these previously studied areas.  
                                                
human rights, and culture. GAL stands for Green/Alternative/Libertarian and TAN stands for 
Traditionalist/Authoritarian/Nationalist. A party’s position on a GAL/TAN dimension was found to better predict 
positions toward transnational issues (namely European Integration) than its left-right position on economic 
distribution policies. 
 







CHAPTER 3: GAPS IN THE RESEARCH: 
IS THE TRANSNATIONAL CLEAVAGE A WESTERN PHENOMENON? 
 
 While there is compelling evidence that there is a transnational cleavage at play in many 
Western European and North American democracies, nations outside of those regions that have 
similar histories of democratic competition and felt similar pressures of globalization have by and 
large been left out of academic consideration. With a few notable exceptions (Strijbis et. al, 2018, 
de Wilde et. al, 2014) most of the literature about the emergence of a globalization cleavage has 
focused solely on European Union and European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) member states, 
and sometimes North America. A country such as Turkey, who is a NATO member, an EU 
candidate state, and whose territory is partially on the European continent, would certainly seem 
to fit the criteria for analysis.8 This lack of attention is partially due to data availability issues, but 
there is also a compelling argument that Turkey has been excluded from studies of this nature 
because it is not culturally perceived to be a part of Europe (Müftüler-Baç, 2000). Despite this, the 
policies toward migration and trade of Turkey and the EU are inseparably linked, and the 
longstanding position of Turkey as a NATO member and a democracy, albeit a troubled one, 
means that the county has a history similar to the nations that the transnational cleavage has had a 
                                                
8 Turkey’s position as a transcontinental nation, with territory and cultural ties in both Europe and Asia, makes 
classifying it as a part of a region of analysis difficult. While many previous studies of cleavage theory tend to 
analyze “Europe”, the nations included in that name are often more closely tied with membership in the EU/EFTA. 
For this reason, when I discuss a previous lack of attention given to Turkey as opposed to Europe and North 
America, I am referencing the fact that by different measures Turkey is variably a part of different regions and has 
often been left out of studies surrounding “Europe”. For the purposes of this thesis, I will consider Turkey to be both 
wholly European and wholly Asian, as its transcontinental ties make it impossible to classify into one group or 
another, and it is therefore more useful to consider it to be a part of both regional groupings. 
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demonstrated effect on. The fact that so little attention has been given to the emergence of a 
transnational cleavage outside of Europe, much less in a country that is by many measures 
European such as Turkey, thus presents a gap in the research.  
 Globalization in Turkey has been extensive, and the process of EU membership 
negotiations over the course of the AKP governance period have proven to be deeply contentious 
(Strijbis et. al, 2018; Öniş, 2007; Keyman and Koyuncu, 2006). The development and 
liberalization of the economy throughout the 1990s was far-reaching (Zürcher, 2017) and gave rise 
to a host of new business communities, such as the “Anatolian Tigers”, which drove economic 
globalization (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman, 2012). The economic integration and creation of a 
customs union between Turkey and the EU allowed for increased cash flow and direct European 
investments to be made in Turkey as it became a major manufacturing center for industries such 
as automobiles and textiles (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman, 2012). This process has certainly divided 
the Turkish business community between the “winners” and “losers” of globalization, as 
traditionally protectionist economic policies have been swept away (Zürcher, 2017). In addition to 
the contentious economic opening and linking of the Turkish and EU economies, Turkey has 
become one of the largest migrant destinations in the world due to its position as a transit stop on 
migrant routes from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe (Fait, 2013). Turkey now holds 
almost four million refugees and migrants, mainly Syrians, which represents a dramatic increase 
in the number of people seeking shelter in the country (UNHCR, 2020). Even before the major 
influx of immigration, however, anti-immigrant sentiment and policies were becoming an 
increasingly prevalent force in Turkish politics (Korkut, 2014). Thus, the external forces associated 
with driving a transnational cleavage in Europe, have become ever more present in Turkey over 
the period of AKP governance. 
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 Examinations of a globalization cleavage in Turkey have been sparse, but have so far 
resulted in mixed conclusions. One early study classified Turkish parties as fundamentally divided 
along the lines of their relationship to the EU, categorizing the AKP as “conservative globalists” 
and the CHP as “defensive nationalists” (Öniş, 2007). Clearly, however, the AKP’s reversal on 
EU reforms and cooperation at the supranational level, and the CHP’s renewed commitment to the 
Turkish EU-bid show that these stances no longer hold. In a test of polarization amongst voters 
and parties along the lines of a transnational cleavage, it was found that while Turkish voters had 
polarized along transnational divisions, the parties had not yet moved their platforms to meet their 
voters (Strijbis et. al, 2018). A 2011 media discourse study determined that there was not a major 
break-away from pro-transnational messaging in the media (de Wilde et. al, 2014). It is important 
to note, however, that this was a media study instead of a party position survey that came to its 
findings before the major wave of immigration and political crises of and after 2013, which rocked 
Turkish politics. These studies are, thus, largely inconclusive regarding the presence of a 
transnational cleavage in Turkey, and in need of updating.  
 While the widespread applicability of a transnational/globalization cleavage in 
democracies around the world is outside the scope of this paper, the limited attention in prior 
research and major changes in Turkish politics over the previous decade makes this case ripe for 
an analysis of the effects of transnational forces on party position. Cleavage theory would predict 
that in Turkey, the role of globalizing forces will drive the already existing moderately GAL (CHP) 
and TAN (AKP) parties to newly polarized positions on the key transnational issues of 
supranational cooperation/EU integration and immigration. To better understand the context in 
which this analysis takes place, the following section will outline a history of Turkish politics and 
cleavage structure in the multi-party competition era, as well as an overview of the current electoral 
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system and political parties that occupy it. It is important to examine the similarities and 
differences that existed in the political system of Turkey in comparison to other countries where a 
globalization cleavage has been identified, as it will elucidate how to best identify the presence or 

























CHAPTER 4: THE TURKISH CASE 
 
The Turkish party system has, since the introduction of multiparty democracy in the 1950s, 
predominantly been defined by two cleavages: the first is a religious cleavage between Islamists 
and Secularists. The second is an ethnic cleavage between Turkish nationalists and Kurdish 
nationalists (Özbudun, 2013). In his book on the Turkish party system and the cleavages 
underlying it, Özbudun defines the current party structure in Turkey as a four-party system, with 
the two major parties (AKP and CHP) structured along the Secularist-Islamist division and the two 
minor parties, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) and the People’s 
Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), structured along the Turkish-Kurdish 
dimension. From a GAL/TAN perspective, the HDP is the most GAL party, the CHP is moderately 
GAL, and the AKP and MHP are solidly TAN parties, as shown in Figure 1. While the GPS dataset 
uses the phrasing “social Liberal-Conservative,” their definition is analogous to the “new politics” 
definition that Hooghe et. al (2002) provide when defining the GAL/TAN dimension, and thus I 
use this measure to demarcate GAL/TAN positions (Norris, 2019). Despite repeated government 
overhauls and military interventions, party contestation has consistently formed along the lines of 
these conflicts in the era of multi-party democracy. These cleavages outweighed the traditional 
left-right cleavage over economics and wealth distribution that historically dominated western 
European party competition (Öniş, 2007, Aydogan and Slapin, 2015). The Turkey of today, 
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however, has been shaped by the changes that have taken place because of both Europeanization 
and globalization.  
Turkish domestic politics of the twentieth century were largely defined by the unique 
characteristics which shaped the country; namely, the history of military interventions and state 
alignment with secularism. Evidence from previous studies suggest, however, that Turkey is being 
redefined by the political and international crises of recent years (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2017; Esen 
and Gümüşçü, 2019).  Hooghe and Marks theory dictates that “the transnational cleavage has had 
distinctly different expressions across Europe. This reflects the contrasting effects and differential 
timing of the economic and migration crisis in the different regions of Europe which play out in 
the context of prior Cleavages,” (Hooghe and Marks, 2018, p. 127). 
 
 
Figure 1. Turkish Party Positions on GAL/TAN Dimension 
*The Global Party Survey measure of Liberal-Conservative listed above is analogous to the GAL/TAN 
measure used by Hooghe et. al (2002), and thus is used as a measure of a given party’s position on this 
dimension. See Appendix for full tables with raw scores. 
 
Turkey’s relationship to both the migrant crisis and the financial collapse of the European 
economy in 2008, has been distinctive due to the country’s position at the crossroads of East and 
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West. Thus, in a nation such as Turkey, which has a unique history with democracy and party 
competition, the way in which the transnational cleavage would interact with prior cleavages 
would be expected to be unique as well. To understand the context in which a transnational 
cleavage might emerge, the following sections will briefly outline a history of multiparty 
democracy and the electoral system in Turkey, as well as an explanation of how globalization and 
the crises of the twenty-first century have shaped the country’s political discourse. 
 “A Troubled Democracy”: Turkish Party Competition and Electoral System 
The formation of a transnational cleavage does not fully transform parties, but rather layers 
on top of already existing cleavages (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). Additionally, a globalization-
related cleavage can be best thought of as a nationalist break-away from a globalist consensus, 
instead of an independent and parallel formation of two camps at the same time (de Wilde et. al, 
2014). Thus, the new cleavage arises from the emergence of a challenging camp and interacts with 
old cleavages to form the unique political milieu in any given system. This is, in many ways, 
analogous to how Islamist9 parties have attempted to break away from the secularist consensus 
among elites throughout the history of Turkish party competition. Kemalism emphasized the 
importance of cooperation with the West as well as Turkey’s position as a European state, which 
would make the emergence of an anti-transnational camp a break-away from the old Kemalist 
status-quo as well. To understand the emergence of a transnational cleavage in the greater context 
of Turkish politics, it is important to understand the divisions that have defined party competition 
over the course of the democratic period. Ergun Özbudun provides a useful framework for 
                                                
9 As a definition of political Islamism in the Turkish context, it is worth quoting at length from Göle (1997, p. 47) 
who defined the concept as: “‘Islamism’ indicates the reappropriation of a Muslim identity and values as a basis for 
an alternative social and political agenda (to that of the [Kemalist] state). ‘Muslim’ is not synonymous with 




understanding the Turkish cleavage structure at the time of the crises, describing a system defined 
by a primary division along a Secularist vs. Islamist cleavage, and a secondary division along a 
Turkish vs. Kurdish cleavage (2013). These divisions evolved gradually over time as the country 
allowed for more free and open political competition, and they are the basis of the political 
conflicts that take place today in Turkey.  
The party structure of contemporary Turkey has been defined by the divisions that arose 
during and after the one-party regime of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the CHP (Özbudun, 2013, 
Zürcher, 2017). The political reactions to Kemalism10 and its defenders amongst the political and 
bureaucratic elite shaped the crises and critical junctures of Turkish politics throughout the 
twentieth century. Thus, for the purposes of this study it is most useful to start a review of Turkish 
party competition with the beginning of the era of multi-party democracy in the 1950s. In that 
time, the Turkish political system had its first foray into multiparty competition with the peaceful 
transition of power from the regime-founding CHP to the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) 
in 1950. In a pattern that would repeat itself many times over the coming decades, the DP governed 
the country for a decade before a group of military officers removed them from power through a 
coup d’état in May of 1960, because they determined that the DP strayed too far from the principles 
of Kemalism. There would be many more military interventions, if not full-scale coups, throughout 
the remainder of the twentieth century. The general cleavages along which parties formed, 
however, by and large did not change (Özbudun, 2013).  
                                                
10 During the one-party regime of the CHP, the ideology of the state, Atatürk, and his party was flexible to the needs 
of the nation, but eventually the six ‘arrows’ of Kemalism would be canonized as “republicanism, secularism, 
nationalism, populism, statism and revolutionism (or reformism)” (Zürcher, 2017, p. 113). The fact that the forces of 
secularism and modernization were imposed by the elites in Turkey, a “revolution from above” as they came to be 
known, has created the unique dynamic in Turkish politics in which the center-right and moderate islamists have 
historically been associated with pushing for further democratization, while the CHP, who declared themselves to be 




 In the multiparty democracy era, major parties formed generally along the lines which 
would come to form the Secularist vs. Islamist cleavage. The CHP represented the pro-secularist 
position for most of this period, and were challenged by a succession of center-right parties who 
competed to win over a broad coalition of the population. The first of these was the DP, but they 
would be succeeded by a host of other center right parties including the Justice Party (Adalet 
Partisi, AP), the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), and the True-Path Party (Doğru 
Yol Partisi, DYP). It should be noted, however, that none of these center-right parties were 
blatantly Islamist until the 1990s (Zürcher, 2017). A pattern emerged in which a civilian 
government either reached a political stalemate or strayed too far away from secularism, resulting 
in military intervention and control of the country through the National Security Council (NSC), 
and then returned the country to civilian power with a newly restrictive constitution. After military 
interventions, parties that had been in government were often banned, but clear ‘successor’ parties 
kept the ideological legacy of former movements alive. After a period of crisis in the 1970s, the 
coup of 1980 created the current system of government which is the Third Turkish Republic. The 
new constitution was ratified in 1982, and while it is still the constitution under which Turkey is 
governed today it has been amended several times. Under the 1982 constitution, Turkey began to 
gradually politically liberalize throughout the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, cooperation 
with the European Community increased and the country liberalized economically under the 
leadership of Turgut Özal and Tansu Çiller. Political competition gradually opened to more 
representative parties, allowing both leftists and Islamists the chance to compete in elections. This 
eventually led to the electoral victory of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) in 1994 and the 
introduction of Turkey’s first Islamist government. 
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 In the 1994 general elections, the openly Islamist RP became the largest party in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). They then came into government until they were 
practically forced out of power by the threat of military intervention in 1997, and were later banned 
by the constitutional court. The rise of the RP, despite its brevity, was a remarkable development 
in Turkish political history. While politics had for so long been dominated by factions within a 
Kemalist consensus, the RP advocated an openly religious and conservative society. During their 
tenure in government they focused on turning away from the EU and toward traditional Turkish 
society (Zürcher, 2017). This period can thus be viewed as a water-shed moment where Islamists 
were first able to break away from the elite Kemalist consensus. While the RP was not destined 
for longevity, its former members would spawn a party that was. The AKP would succeed the RP 
and its government would crystalize the political cleavage structure that Özbudun outlines, as will 
be shown below.  
Cleavages and the Current Parties 
 The two major parties in Turkey today, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), are formed along the primary division between Islamists (AKP) 
and Secularists (CHP). The two minor parties, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the 
People’s Democratic Party (HDP), are subsequently formed along the lines of the secondary 
division between right-wing Turkish nationalists (MHP) and left-wing Kurdish nationalists (HDP). 
As shown in Figure 1, the HDP and the CHP represent the left-wing, while the AKP and the MHP 
represent the right. Since 2002, however, the AKP has consistently been the majority party in 
government, which has led to the widespread classification of Turkey as a predominant party 
system (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman, 2012; Arslantaş et. al, 2020). The reorientation of AKP policy 
away from reform and Europeanization and toward conservative populism and authoritarianism is 
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thus one of the main phenomena that drives this thesis. The changes in the tenor and alliances of 
the main opposition party are also indicative of change and polarization in the cleavage structure 
that is presented here. To further elucidate the political niche in which each party currently fits, 
this section will proceed with an overview and analysis of the cleavage structure of all four of the 
major parties. 
 As reviewed in the section on the history of the Turkish political party system above, the 
AKP is the successor to many different center-right parties with Islamic leanings that have existed 
and disbanded over the course of the twentieth century. AKP leadership were educated and 
developed in the Islam-oriented RP, which disbanded in the aftermath of the ‘post-modern coup’ 
of 1997. Out of the ashes of the RP, the party split between conservative hard-liners and the 
modernizers who formed the AKP.11 After its formation in 2001, the party won a majority in 
parliament in 2002. They rode a coalition of the urban poor, the under-educated, and religious 
conservatives to a massive electoral victory (Çarkoğlu, 2008). A turn away from international 
cooperation and toward more traditionalist policies has placed the AKP more firmly onto the 
Islamist branch of the cleavage structure (Kirdiş, 2015). While originally viewed as moderate 
center right reformers, often referred to as “Muslim Democrats,” the AKP has turned now toward 
its power base. The AKP is, at the time of writing, in government with 291 of the 600 seats in the 
national assembly. Their poor showing in the constitutional referendum of 2017 and the municipal 
elections of 2019, however, indicates that a more significant opposition to their rule, and to the 
authoritarian tendencies of President Erdoğan, may be forming. 
                                                
11 After the RP disbanded, its former members created the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP), but when hardline 
Islamists refused to compromise, more centrist modernizers split off and formed the AKP. Thus, the most accurate 
interpretation is that the AKP emerged from the RP after a brief interlude as the FP. 
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In government, the AKP is supported by the MHP, who currently holds 49 of the 600 seats 
in the TGNA and occupies the right-wing Turkish nationalist pole of the secondary cleavage 
between Turkish and Kurdish nationalists (Özbudun, 2013). The party represents right-wing ultra-
nationalist ideals and has been historically known for the violence of its paramilitary wing, the 
Grey Wolves. Throughout its existence, the party has been varyingly Islamist and Secularist given 
the needs of the situation, but it has been steadfastly anti-Kurdish and in favor of pan-Turkism,12 
showing that while the party is firm on its position on the Turkish-Kurdish cleavage, it is willing 
to oscillate on the Secularist-Islamist one. The party has most recently sided with the AKP in 
support of the government, and backed Erdoğan in the constitutional referendum of 2017 (Esen 
and Gümüşçü, 2017). This alliance could be indicative of a more rightward swing from the AKP 
since the last general election and the constitutional referendum. 
 The main left-wing party in opposition is the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which 
currently holds 139 of the 600 seats in the TGNA. The oldest party in Turkey, the CHP was 
Atatürk’s party and is thus classified as a regime founding party (Özbudun, 1970). The CHP now 
represents the center-left/moderate-GAL wing of Turkish politics, although the party often lacks 
credibility as a GAL party due to its historical support of the military, elites, and nationalism 
(Zürcher, 2017). After eighteen years in the wilderness, however, the CHP has started to find 
success by modernizing the Kemalist platform. A self-described “social democratic” party, the 
CHP has sought to craft a broader left wing coalition by appealing to a social market economy and 
the promotion of a liberal national culture (Alaranta, 2019). While they have worked to shift party 
position toward a new-left platform (Bayram, 2015), it is possible that they may still lack 
authenticity given their long history of militarism and statism. The party’s 2014 presidential 
                                                
12 Pan-Turkism is the nationalist belief in the superiority of, and need for the unification or connection of, all the 
ethnically and linguistically Turkish nations of Central Asia. 
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candidate, Ekmelledin İhsanoğlu, was criticized for being too close to Erdoğan, with some critics 
even describing him as “Erdoğan light” (Zürcher, 2017, p. 359). While the CHP attempted a run 
to the center in that presidential campaign, Erdoğan ran to the populist right and saw spectacular 
results. Erdoğan depicted himself not as a unifier, but rather as the savior of his conservative 
religious base. Erdoğan’s victory, despite the anger directed at him and his party that erupted in 
2013 when millions of Turks took to the streets, showed that the secularists clearly failed to tap in 
to the political feeling championed by the leftist groups of the Gezi Park movement. Now the CHP 
is attempting to form a more truly left-wing coalition that can combat Erdoğan in an increasingly 
polarized environment. 
 On the far left, the HDP occupies the left-wing pro-Kurdish pole of the secondary cleavage. 
In 2015, the party stood on its own for the first time and no longer ran its candidates as 
independents. They successfully gained a foothold in the TGNA in the June 2015 elections, and 
even with a reduction in vote share in the “repeat election” in November, the HDP survived with 
roughly 11 percent of the vote, translating into 59 of the 600 seats in the TGNA (Celep, 2018). 
The HDP is a continuation of the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), 
and it is built of a coalition of “new-left” groups that advocate for social change, but it is mainly 
centered around its Kurdish nationalist sentiments. The CHP was previously unwilling to move 
from its Kemalist stance of Turkish nationalism which had no tolerance for Kurdish breakaways, 
but in the constitutional referendum of 2017, the HDP and the CHP formed an anti-government 
alliance. This partnership places the CHP and the HDP in a position to potentially form a longer-
term left-wing alliance. 
 These four parties occupy the electoral blocs that reflect the major social cleavages which 
have historically defined Turkish domestic politics. It is thus deeply important to think about how 
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the emergence of a transnational cleavage would affect and interact with the party structure as it 
currently exists. The AKP has, by and large, not needed coalitions to form a government since 
their rise to power in 2002; even the brief period that could have brought about coalition 
government after the general elections of June 2015 resulted in a hung parliament. This was 
partially due to the uncompromising nature of the AKP and the MHP, but also because the 
vilification of the HDP as the party of terror prevented the effective alignment of left-wing parties 
(Kalaycioğlu, 2016). In the 2017 constitutional referendum, however, clear lines were drawn 
between the AKP and the MHP who formed a right-wing TAN alliance, while the CHP and the 
HDP formed a left-wing GAL alliance (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2017). This is evidence not only of 
the polarization of the center-right AKP and the center-left CHP, but of the more coherent ability 
of the right and left wing parties to work together for political aims. Thus, polarization of the 
central parties along the issues that were hit upon in the constitutional referendum (EU pushed 
reforms, democracy issues, and national security) could be evidence of transnational forces 
moving the parties. It should be noted, additionally, that the D’Hondt electoral system which 
governs representation in the TGNA influences the ability of new movements to arise and when 
positional change within already established parties is expected.	
Implications of the Turkish Electoral System 
Hooghe and Marks’ theory of new and emerging cleavages expects that when a new 
cleavage develops in a low-barrier system, new parties will form along the axis of that cleavage 
and enter the political arena to more adeptly compete on those issues than already existing parties 
can (2018). In systems, however, where the barrier to entry for new parties is high and younger 
movements thus cannot as easily enter the legislature and build up a support base, movement is 
expected to take place within the already existing parties. The Turkish system, which includes a 
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10 percent national threshold for representation of any party in the TGNA, represents an extremely 
high barrier to entry for new parties. The current electoral system is a D’Hondt system with a 
national threshold of 10 percent, making the Turkish electoral requirement for new parties the 
highest formal barrier in the world (Arslantaş et. al, 2020). This system has kept many of the newer 
movements on both the left and right flank from entering national politics in Turkey. The abolition 
of previously existent constituency level thresholds has allowed parties like the MHP and the HDP 
to become more prominent in the TGNA, but still limits smaller parties that do not have a large 
national organization network (like the MHP) or a regionally concentrated constituency (like the 
HDP) from entering government and being represented (Özbudun, 2013). Thus, the emergence of 
new parties has only been possible in situations like that of the HDP, where a strong base of 
regional support is present.  
 When addressing the emergence of a new cleavage in Turkish politics, movement is not 
expected to come from new challenging parties; instead, the conflict over the cleavage is expected 
to play out through movements of the already established parties. In this case, there is some 
qualitative evidence that both the AKP and the CHP have changed their platforms to fit the 
expected positions of parties which form along the transnational cleavage, with the AKP turning 
more authoritarian, nationalist, and anti-EU while the CHP has embraced social democracy, “new 
left” social issues, and has taken up the cause of reinvigorating Turkey’s EU membership bid 
(Alaranta, 2020, Esen and Gümüşçü, 2019, Bayram, 2015). Additionally, the alliance of the AKP 
with the ultra-nationalists and the CHP with the pluralist-leftists points to the further polarization 
and alignment of the Turkish party system along transnational lines. To examine these claims, I 







CHAPTER 5: HYPOTHESES 
 Given the changes that have taken place in Turkish political competitions over the previous 
decades of AKP rule, I hypothesize the following:  
 
H1: Polarization along a transnational cleavage like the one identified in the political parties of 
EU member states is identifiable in major Turkish parties. 
 
 This hypothesis is, as stated before, based on an expansion of the ideas put forward by 
Hooghe and Marks when identifying a transnational cleavage across political parties in EU 
member states. Thus, H1 expects to find evidence of a cleavage which has arisen “as a reaction to 
reforms that have weakened national sovereignty, promoted international economic exchange, 
increased immigration and exacerbated cultural and economic insecurity,” (Hooghe and Marks, 
2018, p. 110). Because Turkey has extremely high barriers to entry for new political parties, H1 
thus predicts that the main established parties (the AKP and the CHP) have been pushed internally 
to compete on the globalization related issues of support for the EU and immigration which are far 
from their core programmatic platforms. The issues that polarization is expected upon are: support 
for supranational cooperation/European integration and support of immigration. The polarization 
of the Turkish center-left and center-right parties along these issues is thus expected to be 
analogous to that of similar parties in Europe over the course of the twenty-first century, meaning 
that socially liberal/GAL parties will have polarized to be pro-supranationalism and pro-
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immigration, whereas socially conservative/TAN parties will have polarized to be anti-
supranationalism and anti-immigration. Thus, in comparison to European Union member state 
parties, the Turkish parties are expected have similarly polarized. 
 Additionally, this thesis seeks to examine the changes in party position that have occurred 
in major Turkish parties over time. Thus, I additionally hypothesize the following: 
 
H2: There has been positional realignment on transnational issues between the AKP and the 
CHP since 2002, with the CHP becoming the pro-transnational party and the AKP becoming the 
anti-transnational party. 
 
 A time series charting of the party discourse used by the AKP and the CHP since 2002 in 
their election manifestos will yield a better understanding of how the parties have moved in 
response to “the internationalization of economic exchange, migration and political authority,” 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2018, p. 127). To measure whether the AKP and CHP have polarized in their 
sentiments about transnational issues as expected of existent parties in high-barrier systems, this 
hypothesis will be examined through content analytical data taken from manifestos since the 
AKP’s first election victory in 2002. Thus, H2 expects that since their entry into government, the 
AKP has become the “anti-transnational” party in Turkish politics, whereas the CHP has become 
the “pro-transnational” party. For example, on the issue of European integration, both parties are 
expected to have moved from a position of at least nominal support of EU reforms and integration, 
to a position in which the AKP is now anti-EU and the CHP is now pro-EU. Similar polarization 
is expected on the issue of immigration, with H2 predicting that the AKP will have increased the 
amount of negative mentions of immigration in its manifesto over the course of the last eighteen 
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years, and the CHP will have conversely increased the number of positive mentions of immigration 



























CHAPTER 6: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 To test these hypotheses, I will be examining cross-sectional expert survey data from the 
Global Party Survey (GPS) as well as content analytical data from the Manifesto Project (MP) 
taken between 2002 and 2019. Obtaining publicly available data surrounding Turkish party 
positions was a challenge and required searching for datasets which could be used to analyze the 
expectations of the transnational cleavage. Indeed, this lack of data is one of the reasons that 
Turkey has largely been excluded from previous studies of a globalization cleavage. Ideally, a long 
form cross-sectional expert survey like the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) would be available 
for comparison over time, but as one is not currently available, I use a combined method to analyze 
Turkish party positions. The GPS is ideally suited for this analysis, but it is a relatively new study, 
and the 2019 release is the first wave of data meaning that comparison to earlier party positions is 
impossible. Thus, to measure changes in party sentiment over time, I look to the Manifesto Project 
to gain a sense of how the tone of the Turkish parties has changed over the course of the period of 
AKP governance. While this method does not allow me to directly correlate the two findings from 
H1 and H2, it does provide the means for comparison and hints toward the direction that can be 
taken with further research. The data from the GPS has been selected to analyze H1, whereas the 
data from the MP will be used to analyze H2. Thus, the paper will examine two separate angles of 
the transnational cleavage in Turkey, one based on the relative positioning of Turkish parties 
within the domestic political arena and one based on the change in tone of the parties toward 




 The Global Party Survey Data (GPS) 
 To analyze the claims made in H1, I follow Hooghe and Marks (2018) in using expert 
survey data to measure Turkish party policy positions. Data taken from the recently released first 
wave of the GPS is used to measure policy positions in comparison to the positions found amongst 
political parties in EU member states by previous studies. This survey asks experts to rate parties 
on, among other issues, supranational cooperation and immigration. The transnational cleavage 
theory argues that these party positions on the transnational issues of EU integration and 
immigration should be more polarized if a cleavage has emerged, giving me the data I need to test 
H1. In line with Hooghe and Marks’ theory I expect that the moderately-GAL CHP will have 
become the pro-transnational party (pro-EU and pro-immigration) and the strongly-TAN AKP will 
have become the anti-transnational party (anti-EU and anti-immigration). 
The choice of to use the GPS for H1 instead of using the MP for both sections of the 
analysis was made due to the contextual depth and reliability of expert surveys. Experts when 
surveyed were asked to provide a range of positions for each party, and to place the political parties 
in each system in relation to each other. While the Manifesto Project data yields a time line analysis 
which can reveal change over a longer period in the way parties frame an issue, in many respects 
the data is shallow and its measure of positive vs. negative mentions captures party sentiment 
rather than position. Thus, the use of expert surveys is preferable for providing context to a party’s 
statements and policies. Experts can elucidate a more sincere and nuanced interpretations of a 
party’s actual positions as opposed to election manifestos which can often include rhetoric which 
does not reflect the party’s core policy program. Marks and Hooghe use the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey (CHES) when analyzing the emergence of a transnational cleavage in EU member states. 
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Strijbis et. al, combine Manifesto data with Expert Survey data to try to gain a fuller grasp of party 
position. As such, I intend to use the newly released Global Party Survey (GPS), to gain more 
context as to the current position of the major Turkish parties (Norris, 2019). The use of cross-
sectional expert survey data will yield a recent and contextualized view of party positions in 
Turkey, that can be compared to those of the EU member state parties that Hooghe and Marks 
analyze (2018). 
 Among Turkish parties, the GPS contains data on the AKP, the CHP, the MHP, and HDP. 
The dataset additionally contains variables which measure positions toward multilateralism and 
immigration on a scale from 0 to 10. For example, in the case of multilateralism a zero would 
represent a completely nationalist party whereas a score of 10 would represent a completely 
multilateral party. As the GPS covers parties from democracies all over the world it does not 
distinguish a specific variable for support of the European Union, but the multilateralism variable 
explicitly includes cooperation with the EU as part of its definition. While a distinct EU support 
variable would have been preferable for the Turkish context, the transnational cleavage revolves 
around supranational cooperation in any democracy and therefore this measure accurately captures 
the thrust of the theory. The explicit immigration variable fully captures the policy that I am 
seeking to analyze, allowing me to accurately test H1. 
Manifesto Project Data 
 The Manifesto Project is a dataset which collects and codes electoral manifestos of political 
parties from countries all around the world. These manifestos are coded by sentences and quasi-
sentences to measure the percentage of the document that is dedicated to either positive or negative 
mentions of an issue (Volkens et. al, 2019). Among these issues that are measured are party 
positions on multiculturalism and the European Union, which are analogous to the issues analyzed 
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with the GPS dataset in part one of the analysis. While the MP dataset has no independent measure 
of manifesto statements about immigration that fits my complete time frame (one was introduced 
only after 2015), the coding of the multiculturalism topic includes immigration and will give a 
sense for how the parties approach immigrants and non-Turks living in the country. In every party 
manifesto which is collected and coded, the text is broken down into quasi-sentences which 
analyze the content of the document and calculate the percentage of the text dedicated to a variety 
of issues. Thus, the number of times that a party makes positive or negative mentions of 
transnational issues can be mapped and tracked from manifesto to manifesto to roughly 
approximate how the party was speaking about the issues surrounding the transnational cleavage 
from the period of 2002 to 2019.  
The AKP and CHP are both included in the MP dataset, and their electoral manifestos for 
2002, 2007, 2011, 2015 (both June and November) and 2018 are all included. There are total of 
six manifestos coded for both the CHP and the AKP during the period of 2001 to 2018. Using 
these six manifestos, it is possible to trace party sentiment on the issues listed above, and to track 
movement on these issues by the AKP and CHP over this period. The MHP is also included in the 
MP dataset for all six of the elections included, but the HDP is not as it is a successor to earlier 
Kurdish nationalist parties. Thus, the decision to include only the AKP and the CHP in the analysis 
of H2 was made to test what the hypothesis is stating (that major central parties will have moved 
in relation to transnational pressures) but also due to constraints not allowing for the analysis of 
all four parties. 
Methods of Analysis 
 This study is, fundamentally, a descriptive one and seeks to compare the positions of the 
major Turkish parties in relation to the findings of previous studies regarding transnational issues 
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in EU member states. It does not seek to prove causality, but rather to analyze the application of a 
theory in a previously under-explored geographical context by exploring a variety of measures of 
party position. To gauge these positions, a mixture of expert survey findings and content analytical 
data from party manifestos is applied to gain both a cross-sectional and over time analysis of 
Turkish party positions between 2002 and 2019. To do so, this analysis proceeds as follows: 
 To test H1, that Turkish parties have polarized along the lines of transnational issues 
(support of the EU/supranationalism and immigration) in a similar way as have political parties in 
European Union member states, expert survey data from the GPS dataset is analyzed. In the case 
of Turkey, twenty experts in the country were surveyed on where the four major parties stood on 
a variety of political and policy issues. These scores are averaged to create the 0 to 10 positional 
score that each party has on any given issue. In accordance with Hooghe and Marks theory, the 
four parties are categorized along their GAL/TAN position (coded in the GPS as social Liberal-
Conservative) and then their positional score on the issues of EU support/supranationalism and 
immigration is plotted against that baseline. This allows for analysis of the polarization that the 
transnational cleavage theory predicts, and for comparison to the findings of similar parties in 
European Union member states. The two minor parties, the HDP and the MHP, are included to 
give context to the relative positioning of Turkish parties, even though the theory’s predictions are 
about the two main parties. 
 To test H2, that over the last eighteen years (2002-2019) the AKP and CHP have polarized 
to become the anti- and pro-transnational parties respectively, I use content analytical data from 
the Manifesto Project to plot the percentages of each election manifesto that reference either 
positively or negatively the issues of EU support and multiculturalism. Each party published six 
election manifestos in this period, and the percentage of each manifesto dedicated to positive and 
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negative mentions of EU support and multiculturalism is coded into the dataset. I combined these 
two measures to create a net-support measurement for both variables to track over time each 
party’s support for these issues from election to election. This net-support measurement is plotted 

























CHAPTER 7: RESULTS 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 This thesis finds partial support for Hypothesis 1, concluding that Turkish parties are 
aligned as expected along a transnational cleavage on their positions toward supranationalism and 
the European Union, but reversed on immigration position. Amongst Turkish parties, the HDP is 
scored as the most supportive of the EU/Supranationalism, followed by the CHP. The AKP and 
MHP are both scored as strongly in favor of nationalism and as anti-EU, although the AKP slightly 
less so than the MHP, as displayed in Figure 2 below. Charted against a measure of GAL/TAN, 
the polarization between the parties as expected by H1 is clearly shown. There is a 4.62-point 
difference in the supranationalism/EU positions of the AKP and the CHP which indicates the level 
of polarization that is currently present in the two parties’ positions toward the European Union. 
The positions taken by the parties on supranationalism and the EU are in line with the 
expectations of H1 and those of the transnational cleavage. As expected, in a high barrier system, 
the main GAL (CHP) and TAN (AKP) parties have polarized along the issues of support for the 
European project. The next position along which the parties’ positions were analyzed was their 
stance on immigration policies. The results are displayed below in Figure 3. The findings from this 
portion of the analysis indicate that the policies taken by Turkish parties are not in line with the 
expectations of the transnational cleavage, as the CHP is scored as more GAL but favors more 
restrictive immigration policies than the AKP, who despite being an otherwise TAN party, are 
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catalogued as in favor of liberal immigration policies. The polarization between the two center 
parties on this issue (a 4.56-point spread, almost as large as the gap between them on 
supranationalism and the EU) indicates that there is a stark divide between the parties on this issue, 
but not in the direction expected by H1. Additionally, the positioning of the radical-GAL HDP and 
radical-TAN MHP pose a puzzle, as they are positioned along the lines expected by the 
transnational cleavage. Potential explanations for this partially negative finding on H1, as well as 
the need for further research to explain the structuring of Turkish parties along the immigration 
issue, will be expanded upon in the discussion. 
Thus, while positions toward supranationalism and the EU are polarized as expected by the 
theory, positions toward immigration are reversed from the theory’s expectations. The CHP is far 
more anti-immigrant than the AKP, which indicates that transnational forces have a different 
expression on this issue in Turkey than they do in other globalized immigration nations. This 
section of the analysis used cross-sectional expert survey data to analyze the fitness of Turkish 
parties with the positions predicted by the transnational cleavage theory. To gain an over-time 
perspective, however, of the CHP and AKP’s sentiments on the issues tied to the transnational 









 This thesis finds mixed support for H2, finding that on the dimension of support for the 
European Union, AKP party sentiment as measured in the party’s election manifestos polarized as 
expected, moving from a previously positive tone on the European Union to a much less positive 
one over time. The CHP behaved roughly as expected, but the volatility of its sentiment on the 
issue of the EU poses a new puzzle. While the CHP had a much higher level of positive references 
to the EU in 2002, this figure dips dramatically in the election of 2007, and then climbs to be 
slightly above the AKP post 2011. This leaves the CHP as the more pro-EU of the two parties, 
even though the space between the parties on this measure of EU support is not as wide as the 
transnational cleavage would predict, as displayed in Figure 4 below. 
Along the second dimension of Multiculturalism, again this analysis finds mixed support 
for the hypothesis, as both the AKP and CHP moved upwards in their measured positions toward 
multiculturalism. In contrast to the immigration findings from the GPS dataset, analysis of the 
manifesto content shows that the CHP’s support of multiculturalism increased as expected from a 
previously low level. Not in line with the expectations of H2, however, is the fact that to a lesser 
degree, so did the AKP’s. The way that multiculturalism is defined in the MP dataset may explain 
this discrepancy as it could touch on other multicultural issues in the Turkish context such as the 
Kurdish or Alevi issues.13 I will elaborate further on this possibility in the discussion below. While 
a specific variable to measure immigration policy is not included in the MP dataset until the 2015 
manifestos, Figure 6 displays that while CHP sentiment on multiculturalism writ large generally 
became more positive over the period of analysis, its tone on immigration between 2015 and 2018 
                                                
13 Alevism is a minority sect of Islam which is found mainly in Turkey. The CHP is an overwhelmingly Alevi party 
and Alevis are far less likely than their Sunni counterparts to vote for the AKP, which some scholars have defined as 
an independent cleavage (Çarkoğlu, 2005). 
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did not. In fact, based on the immigration variable that the MP included for the 2015 (both June 
and November) and 2018 elections, it was after the major spike in immigration that party sentiment 
on the issue began to polarize. While this data cannot provide findings as to party sentiment toward 
immigration before 2015, the findings displayed below, in tandem with findings from the GPS, 
indicate that the CHP and the AKP do not align with the transnational cleavage’s expected 











CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION 
 
 In summation, this thesis finds partial support for both H1 and H2. The positions of major 
Turkish parties on the EU and supranationalism fit the expectations of the transnational cleavage, 
and content analytical data from the MP dataset indicate that these parties moved over time roughly 
as predicted. While the movements in positive mentions of the European Union were not a 
complete realignment as the CHP was more pro-EU than the AKP in their 2002 election 
manifestos, the parties have reversed to a point at which the CHP now represents the pro-EU party 
as opposed to the AKP’s anti-EU party. The expert survey data from the GPS convincingly shows 
that the CHP now represents the pro-EU faction in Turkish domestic politics, and that the AKP 
has turned away from their early affinity for Europe. In both analyses, however, the structure of 
the parties’ positions toward immigration did not fit the expectations of the transnational cleavage. 
Instead of polarizing to fit a transnational grouping, the CHP is scored as markedly anti-immigrant 
while the AKP is scored as relatively pro-immigrant according to the analysis of expert-survey 
data. Looking at the MP dataset, although the immigration variable did not cover the full-time 
period of analysis, the strong departure in tone of the manifesto between the 2015 and 2018 
elections to the TGNA indicates that the CHP and AKP have polarized on immigration in the last 
five years, but in the opposite direction of the theory’s prediction. The way that party positions 
toward immigration are structured in Turkey is a puzzle and is deserving of further research. The 
CHP and AKP are not the only parties whose immigration and EU stances are decoupled. There 
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are others across Europe, such as Die Linke in Germany. Researching why the issues of 
immigration and EU support are grouped together in many political contexts, but not in others, is 
a pressing question. Understanding the Turkish immigration debate and why this issue is reversed 
will provide scholars with a better comprehension of how tolerance of multiculturalism manifests 
in non-traditional immigration destinations, and provide a better understanding of Turkey’s 
position in the context of the EU’s immigration regime.  
 As a launching point for further research, it is worthwhile to discuss potential reasons that 
the immigration issue in Turkish parties is not structured along transnational lines. It is outside the 
scope of this thesis to examine any of these possible explanations in depth, but this discussion will 
better contextualize the partially negative finding and serve as a “jumping off point” for future 
research. It is possible that the politics of immigration are simply non-salient to Turkish parties 
who are worried about competing on other issues, and thus adjust immigration policies to fit the 
political needs of the moment. This is the conclusion that Strijbis et. al come to, finding that 
Turkish party preferences on immigration and multiculturalism did not match with that of their 
voters (2018). This means that AKP voters were more anti-immigrant than CHP voters, and yet 
the parties were reversed from those positions. This finding would imply that the Turkish parties 
are not strongly structured along the immigration issue, and movement in their positions comes 
from political expediency. Considering the fact, however, that Turkey has undergone one of the 
single largest migrant influxes ever in the wake of the Syrian civil war since the data from that 
study was produced, it is worth thinking on other explanations for why the parties are reversed 
from the expectations of a transnational cleavage. There are two other explanations that I will 
discuss here, one of which is very particular to Turkey and one of which applies to a conflict of 
wider worldviews. The first, is the potential impact of a Sunni-Alevi cleavage between the parties. 
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The second, is that immigration from Syria touches on a conflict over civilizationism rather than 
a globalization cleavage. 
 First, there is a case to be made that Alevism is the determining factor in the CHP’s anti-
immigrant stances. When the MP data measures positions toward multiculturalism in Turkey it 
may be picking up CHP tolerance of Alevism. Estimates of how many Alevi Muslims live in 
Turkey vary, but the most commonly cited figure is that they make up roughly fifteen percent of 
the population (Karakaya-Stump, 2018).  With ties to both Shi’i Islam as well as the mystic Sufi 
tradition, Alevis represent a coherent block inside Turkey with a distinct cultural identity. Alevis 
have been struggling for equal rights with their Sunni neighbors in Turkey for many years, and 
have been one of the strongest voices in opposition to Islamist parties like the AKP, who represent 
a generally conservative Sunni majority. Alevis are far more likely to vote for the CHP and against 
the AKP, which has been categorized by some scholars as an Alevi-Sunni cleavage in Turkish 
politics (Çarkoğlu, 2005; Çarkoğlu, 2008). The current leader of the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, 
himself has roots in the Alevi community. In contrast, the migrants and refugees coming from 
Syria are by and large Sunni Arabs. President Erdoğan was a strong supporter of the Sunni Arab 
rebel groups in Syria and many former members of these groups have now turned to Turkey for 
safe-haven (Getmansky et. al, 2018). The CHP has accused the AKP of unconditionally supporting 
the rebels in Syria to create a Sunni bloc to counter Iranian aggression. Conversely, Erdoğan 
himself has suggested that the CHP leadership opposed Turkish intervention in Syria because they 
felt kinship with Bashar al-Assad, who is himself an Alawite, another heterodox Muslim sect 
(Kirdiş, 2015). It could be this Alevi-Sunni split over the conflict in Syria which guides the CHP 
and AKP policies toward refugees. This would explain why the CHP’s manifestos included 
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increased support for multiculturalism (which could be support of Alevism and Kurds) but not 
support for immigrants in their most recent manifestos. 
 Another possible explanation for the reversed immigration positions between the CHP and 
the AKP is that the issues of the EU and immigration represent opposite sides of a conflict over 
civilizationism. Brubaker defines civilizationism as an ideology that “[construes] the opposition 
between self and other not in narrowly national but in broader civilizational terms,” (2017, p. 
1193). While Brubaker identifies this thesis in the context of right-wing movements in 
Northwestern Europe, the concept is useful in examining the potential motivations of the AKP and 
CHP about immigration. As most of the immigrants and refugees coming to Turkey are Sunni 
Muslims from Syria14, they represent a constituency which Erdoğan and the AKP have vocally 
supported through their foreign policy for several years (Kirdiş, 2015). President Erdoğan has been 
keen to stress Turkey’s commitment to “ummah”15, and to express support for Islamist movements 
around the Middle East, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Yanaşmayan et. al, 2019; 
Magued, 2018; Kirdiş, 2015). This orientation toward a cross-border Muslim community in the 
Middle East comes directly into contact with the historical legacy of Atatürk and the fundamental 
principles that the CHP advocates. The CHP has always emphasized Turkey’s ties to the Western 
world and to Europe (Alaranta, 2019). It is one of the core tenets of Kemalism. Thus, the issue of 
immigration in Turkey may not hit on a conflict between globalists and nationalists as it has within 
the EU, but rather touches on a civilizational conflict between a westward oriented CHP and an 
                                                
14 It should be noted, however, that while most refugees in Turkey come from Syria, Turkey also hosts roughly 
300,000 other refugees who are mainly from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran (Yanaşmayan et. al, 2019). 
 
15 “Ummah” is a concept which comes from Islam that refers to a “community of the believers” and has become a 
political concept for Islamist politicians to advocate for the unity of the Muslim community across nations 
(Yanaşmayan et. al, 2019).  
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eastward oriented AKP. This would explain the discrepancy as to why the CHP is the pro-EU 
party, but not the pro-immigrant party. 
 Further research is needed to shed light on the way that globalization has affected Turkey 
and its politics. The politics of a nation at the historical, and in many ways current, crossroads of 
the world which has often been defined by its struggle to place itself amongst competing global 
identities, is a complex phenomenon which requires careful study. This thesis found that as the 
same globalizing forces that rocked the political parties of the EU member states made their 
presence felt in Turkey, the reaction of major Turkish parties to supranationalism and the EU was 
as expected, but not their reaction to immigration. There are a variety of potential explanations for 
why the massive increase in the number of refugees in Turkey has not had a similar effect as it has 
had across the rest of Europe, but future research will need to delve deeper to understand how and 
why the parties in Turkey take the positions they do on this issue. As conflict, health crises, and 
climate change will continue to drive more and more refugees to seek safety outside of their homes, 
the fragile refugee sharing regime that Turkey and the EU have built will be tested if it remains in 
place over the years to come. Thus, understanding how politics and parties in Turkey reacts to that 
cooperation with the EU and to further globalization, will be of critical research interest for 










Turkish Party Positions on Supranationalism and the EU 
Taken from the Global Party Survey question: “Next, where do parties currently stand on 
NATIONALISM VERSUS MULTILATERALISM. Those favoring MULTILATERALISM 
seek to respect international treaties, engage with United Nations agencies, and collaborate 
with regional organizations like the EU, OAS, AU, ASEAN, and OSCE. Those favoring 
NATIONALISM reject these ideas. Where would you place each party on the following 
scale?” 
  











7.73 5.88 1.26 0.26 








Turkish Party Positions on Social Liberal-Conservative Dimension 
Taken from the Global Party Survey question: “Parties can also be classified by their current 
social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on 
abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with 
CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing 
that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would 
you place each party on the following scale?” 
 











1.31 2.94 9.33 9.47 
Scores rounded to the Hundredths place. N = 20. Global Party Survey – Norris (2019) 
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Turkish Party Positions on Immigration 
Taken from the Global Party Survey question: “Turning now to party positions on specific 
political issues, where do parties currently stand on IMMIGRATION? Where would you place 
each party on the following scale?” 
 












2.14 7.85 3.29 8.17 
Scores rounded to the Hundredths Place. N = 20. Global Party Survey – Norris (2019) 
 
 
Manifesto Project (MP) Statistics 
 
 
Net EU Support in Party Election Manifestos between 2002 and 2018 
Drawn from Manifesto Project Definitions of 
“European Community/Union: Positive” and “European Community/Union: Negative”. 
 
Positive EU support defined as: “Positive Favorable mentions of European Community/Union in 
general. May include the: Desirability of the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member); 
Desirability of expanding the European Community/Union; Desirability of increasing the ECs/EUs 
competences; Desirability of expanding the competences of the European Parliament.” 
 
Negative EU support defined as: “Negative references to the European Community/Union. May 
include: Opposition to specific European policies which are preferred by European authorities; 
Opposition to the net-contribution of the manifesto country to the EU budget.”. 
 
Percentage of Manifesto dedicated to positive and negative sentiment were combined to create 
a measure of net support. 
 
Year 2002 2007 2011 2015 (1) 2015 (2) 2018 
AKP 1.08 1.37 0.33 0.49 0.47 0.25 
CHP 3.09 -0.19 1.05 0.93 0.97 0.71 










Net Multiculturalism Support in Party Election Manifestos between 2002 and 2018 
Drawn from Manifesto Project Definitions of 
“Multiculturalism: Positive” and “Multiculturalism: Negative”. 
 
Positive Multiculturalism support defined as: “Favorable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural 
plurality within domestic societies. May include the preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic 
heritages within the country including special educational provisions.” 
 
 
Negative Multiculturalism support defined as: “The enforcement or encouragement of cultural 
integration. Appeals for cultural homogeneity in society.” 
 
Percentage of Manifesto dedicated to positive and negative sentiment were combined to create 
a measure of net support. 
 
Year 2002 2007 2011 2015 (1) 2015 (2) 2018 
AKP 0.07 0.10 0.23 0.56 0.61 0.82 
CHP 0.12 0.06 0.95 1.05 1.23 1.78 
Values rounded to the Hundredths Place. N = 12. Manifesto Project – Volkens et. al (2019). 
 
Net Immigration Support in Party Election Manifestos between 2002 and 2018 
Drawn from Manifesto Project Definitions of 
“National Way of Life: Immigration: Positive” and “National Way of Life: Immigration: 
Negative”. 
 
Positive Immigration support defined as: “Statements favoring new immigrants; against restrictions 
and quotas; rejection of the ‘boat is full’ argument. Includes allowing new immigrants for the benefit of 
the manifesto country’s economy.” 
 
 
Negative Immigration support defined as: “Statement advocating the restriction of the process of 
immigration, i.e. accepting new immigrants. Might include statements regarding: Immigration being a 
threat to national character of the manifesto country; ‘the boat is full’ argument; The introduction of 
migration quotas, including restricting immigration from specific countries or regions etc.” 
 
Percentage of Manifesto dedicated to positive and negative sentiment were combined to create 
a measure of net support. 
 
Immigration variable was not added to manifesto dataset until 2015. For this reason, there are 
no values listed for the elections of 2002, 2007, and 2011. 
 
Year 2002 2007 2011 2015 (1) 2015 (2) 2018 
AKP - - - 0.00 0.00 0.84 
CHP - - - 0.00 0.07 -0.09 
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